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Abstract
This paper investigates how a mandatory activation program in Denmark aﬀects the job
ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers. The activation program was introduced in an experi-
mental setting where about half of the workers who became unemployed in the period from
November 2005 to March 2006 were randomly assigned to the program while the other half
was not. It appears that the activation program is very eﬀective. The median unemployment
duration of the control group is 14 weeks, while it is 11.5 weeks for the treatment group.
The analysis shows that the job ﬁnding rate in the treatment group is 30% higher than in
the control group. This result is mainly driven by the more intensive contacts between the
unemployed and the public employment service.
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11 Introduction
Labor market programs aim at bringing unemployed back to work, preferably quickly. For many
programs it is not clear whether or not they are eﬀective and if they are why they are eﬀective.
This paper concerns the evaluation of a mandatory activation program in Denmark which was
implemented in an experimental setting. In two Danish counties about half of the workers who
became unemployed in the period from November 2005 to March 2006 were randomly assigned to
the program while the other half got a regular treatment. Randomization is based on birthday.
If born in the ﬁrst half of a particular month an individual is assigned to the treatment group,
otherwise the individual belongs to the control group. The experimental set-up enables us to
study potential “treatment” eﬀects of the program in great detail.
Our paper contributes to the small literature of experimental studies to assess the eﬀective-
ness of labor market programs.1 Meyer (1995) presents an overview of unemployment insurance
experiments in the U.S. showing that economic incentives aﬀect the speed with which people
leave unemployment. The economic incentives not only refer to cash bonuses but also to in-
creased enforcement of work search rules and a strengthening of the work test. Gorter and Kalb
(1996) ﬁnd that intensive counseling and monitoring increase job ﬁnding rates of unemployed
workers in the Netherlands. Dolton and O’Neill (1996) ﬁnd eﬀects of the so-called Restart ex-
periments in the UK, where unemployment beneﬁt claimants were obliged to attend meetings
with a counselor to receive advice on for example search behavior and training courses. Dolton
and O’Neill (2002) report that the interviews reduced the male unemployment rate ﬁve years
later by 6 percentage points, as compared to a control group for whom participation in the
ﬁrst six-monthly interview took place six months later. Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw
(2006) investigate the eﬀect of counseling and monitoring on Dutch UI recipients ﬁnding that
low-intensity job search assistance programs have at best small eﬀects while high-intensity job
search assistance programs may have a more positive eﬀect on the exit rate to work.
Labor market programs often consist of a combination of “carrot” and “stick”. The carrot
concerns help to the unemployed worker in building up human capital through for example
training or work experience programs or help through advice on job search strategies. The
1See Heckman et al. (1999), Kluve and Schmidt (2002) and Kluve (2006) for general overviews of studies on
the eﬀectiveness of active labor market policies.
2stick concerns an increase in the cost of being unemployed either through reductions of beneﬁts
– beneﬁts sanctions – or through mandatory activities that need time from the unemployed
worker.2 It could also be that workers increase their job ﬁnding rate because of the “threat
eﬀect”, i.e. they want to avoid having to enter a labor market program. Black et al. (2003)
who analyze an experiment on mandatory employment and training programs ﬁnd that some
unemployed workers that are informed about the mandatory character leave unemployment
before they have to enter a program.3
We analyze data from a Danish experiment in which individuals in the treatment group are
confronted with mandatory job search programs, intensive counseling and mandatory training
programs.4 We investigate whether the treatment eﬀect is diﬀerent for diﬀerent groups of indi-
viduals, and whether it depends on the duration of unemployment. We also investigate whether
there is a diﬀerence in treatment eﬀect before, during and after a speciﬁc program. And, we try
to distinguish between the relative importance of carrot and stick.
We ﬁnd that the average treatment eﬀect is robust and of the same magnitude for diﬀerent
groups and at diﬀerent unemployment durations. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that threat eﬀects are
important and we ﬁnd that job search programs are eﬀective in increasing the job ﬁnding rates.5
Training programs are not eﬀective over our period of observation. Finally we speculate that
the eﬀectiveness of the activation programs is driven more by the stick than by the carrot.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide details of the Danish labor
market, the policy experiment and our data. In section 3 we present an exploratory analysis
in which we investigate whether the probability to leave unemployment in a particular time
period is diﬀerent for the treatment group and the control group. We ﬁnd that indeed there is
2There are a few studies on beneﬁt sanctions which all show that the job ﬁnding rate of unemployed that are
confronted with a beneﬁt reduction increases substantially; see e.g. Jensen et al. (2003), Van den Berg et al.
(2004), Abbring et al. (2005) and Lalive et al. (2005).
3Geerdsen (2006) identiﬁes the threat eﬀect of Danish labor market programs by exploiting legislative changes
in the length of the period in which individuals can receive UI beneﬁts without having to participate in a labor
market program. The treat eﬀect results in an almost 100 per cent increase in the job ﬁnding rate. Geerdsen and
Holm (2007) and Rosholm and Svarer (2004) also ﬁnd large threat eﬀects.
4As will be discussed in detail below under our heading “training programs” there are three types of programs:
short work experience, employment subsidy, training and education.
5See Blundell et al. (2004) for a – non-experimental – evaluation of a British mandatory job search program
with similar results.
3a substantial treatment eﬀect. In section 4 we study the treatment eﬀects in more detail using
hazard rate models of job ﬁnding. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Danish activation policy
2.1 The Danish labor market
Denmark is one of the smaller countries in the European Union with 5.4 million inhabitants and
one of the highest GDP per capita in the world. During recent years Danish labor market policies
have received considerable international attention of economists and policy makers because the
unemployment rate has been decreasing to a level signiﬁcantly below the unemployment rate of
most other OECD countries while social security schemes have remained relatively generous. In
2005 the OECD standardized unemployment rate in Denmark was 4.8% while in OECD Europe
8.7% of the labor force was unemployed.
The terms “ﬂexicurity” – a contraction of ﬂexibility and security – and the “Danish Golden
Triangle” are often used to characterize Danish labor market institutions. One side of the triangle
consists of ﬂexible rules for hiring and ﬁring of workers. This makes it easy for employers to
dismiss workers during recessions and rehire them during booms. Wage earners have security
in the form of relatively generous beneﬁts if they become unemployed. This income security
is the second side of the triangle. The third side of the triangle is a very active labor market
policy which operates according to the “right-and-duty” principle. Unemployed have a right
to receive assistance, but at the same time, they have a duty to participate in meetings and
active labor market programs when oﬀered in order to remain eligible to unemployment beneﬁts.
Since the mid 1990s the use of active labor market programs has been extended considerably,
and Denmark is among the countries that have the highest spending on active labor market
policies measured as a percentage of GDP (Martin and Grubb (2001)).
Denmark has two types of unemployment beneﬁts: unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts
and social assistance beneﬁts. Social assistance beneﬁts are means tested, whereas the level of
UI beneﬁts is related to previous earnings. Only members of a UI fund can receive UI beneﬁts.
Because the UI beneﬁt scheme is more generous than the social assistance beneﬁt scheme, and
because the state highly subsidizes UI funds, 80% of the labor force are members of a UI fund.
To be entitled to UI beneﬁts, unemployed individuals must have been members of a UI fund for
4at least 1 year and they must have been employed for at least 52 weeks within the last three
years. The maximum duration of UI beneﬁts is four years.6 UI beneﬁts are equal to 90% of
previous earnings with a maximum insurable earnings level of approximately $32,000 per year.
The average replacement rate for UI beneﬁt recipients is 70%. UI beneﬁt recipients have to be
activated in ALMPs when they have been unemployed for 1 year.7 However they can receive
“oﬀers” to participate in ALMPs during the entire unemployment period and even from the
very beginning of their unemployment period.
2.2 Set-up of the experiment
In the experiment half of the newly unemployed UI beneﬁt recipients8, who register themselves
as unemployed at the Public Employment Service (PES) during the period from November 1,
2005 to February 28, 2006, are assigned to participate in a specially tailored program package.
These individuals constitute the treatment group of the experiment. They are all born between
the 1st and the 15th of a given month. The other half of the newly unemployed UI beneﬁt
recipients, who register themselves as unemployed at the PES during this period receive the
normal services from the PES. These individuals constitute the control group. They are born
on the 16th or a later day of a given month. Since selection into treatment or control group
is based on birth dates within a given month and there is no reason to think that the timing
of birth within a particular month is related to job ﬁnding rates, the experiment is a truly
random. Two Danish counties – Storstrøm County and South Jutland County – participated in
the experiment. Each county has approximately 250,000 inhabitants.
The selection of the treatment group and the control group is made in several steps which are
described in more detail in Appendix A. For the treatment group the procedure was as follows
6Individuals who have just ﬁnished education or apprenticeship obtain entitlement to UI beneﬁts after a
membership period of 1 month without any employment requirement. The UI beneﬁt amount received by these
newly educated individuals is 82% of the UI beneﬁt amount received by UI beneﬁt recipients who fulﬁl the normal
criteria for UI beneﬁt entitlement.
7Individuals below 30 years and individuals above 60 years have to be activated in an ALMP after 6 months
of unemployment.
8Newly unemployed individuals are individuals who begin an unemployment period with a “clean seniority
record” in the UI beneﬁt system, i.e. they are eligible for UI beneﬁts for the maximum UI beneﬁt period (4 years)
measured from the beginning of their unemployment period.
5(see also the schedule presented in Figure 1):
1. When an individual notiﬁed the PES that he/she was unemployed, within 1.5 weeks the
individual received a letter saying that he/she was selected to participate in the program.
The letter also gave a short description of the activities contained in the program.
2. After 5-6 weeks of unemployment individuals had to participate in a job search program
which lasts 2 weeks. After the program the individuals had to attend meetings once a
week or once every second week. The purpose of the meetings was to assist individuals in
their job search and to monitor job search eﬀorts. The individuals could also receive job
oﬀers mediated by the PES.
3. Before individuals were unemployed for 4 months they had to receive an oﬀer to participate
in an activation program with a duration of at least 3 months. Longer classroom training
courses (with a duration of more than 3 months) could not be oﬀered at this stage.
4. Individuals who did not ﬁnd a job after 6-7 months had to participate in a longer meeting
with a case worker and a new job plan was made. The job plan contained a description of
the activities to improve the chances of ﬁnding a job. All available active measures could
be used at this stage including longer education programs.
The services oﬀered to the control group during the early stage of the unemployment period
were much less intensive than the services oﬀered to the treatment group. Individuals in the
control group typically would have to participate in an activation program after one year of
unemployment. UI beneﬁt recipients below 30 and UI beneﬁt recipients above 60 would have
to participate in an activation program after 6 months of unemployment though. Job search
assistance and monitoring was less intensive and less formalized for the control group than for
the treatment group.
2.3 Available data
The data used in our analysis are from two diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst data source is the admin-
istrative registers of the PES. From these registers we have the following pieces of information
for each individual: treatment status (in treatment group or control group), age, sex, immigrant
6status (immigrant or non-immigrant), country of origin, ﬁrst week of the individuals unemploy-
ment spell (can be one of the weeks from the last week of October (week 43) in 2005 to the
last but one week of February (week 8) in 2006 i.e. one of the weeks in the assignment period
of the experiment), county where the individual lives, and previous occupation.9 There is also
information about all meetings (type and date) held between the unemployed individuals and
caseworkers at the PES or with private contractors.10
The second data source is the DREAM database developed by the Danish National Labor
Market Authority. From the DREAM database we have detailed weekly information about
individuals receipt of diﬀerent public income transfers. The quality of the information generally
is very high. The event history information from the DREAM database is used to determine
the duration of unemployment spells and the exit state. For each individual an unemployment
spell starts in the week in which the individual became unemployed. The unemployment spell
continues until the individual stopped receiving UI beneﬁts (or participate in ALMPs) for four
consecutive weeks.11
We have data up to mid September 2006. Since there have to be at least 4 weeks without
UI beneﬁts (or ALMP participation) to generate an exit from unemployment there are no exits
from the unemployment spells during the four last weeks of the observation period. This means
that unemployment spells are censored after 43 weeks for those individuals who were assigned
into the experiment in the ﬁrst week of the assignment period. Similarly, unemployment spells
of the individuals who were assigned into the experiment in the last week of the assignment
period are censored after 26 weeks. Because of the relatively short observation period we only
include information on the ﬁrst unemployment spell of the individuals under study.
9The occupational classiﬁcation is based on the name of the UI fund that pays UI beneﬁts to the individual.
10In some cases the normal contact sequence between the PES and unemployed individuals are contracted out
to an external private contractor.
11If a worker became ill his/her beneﬁts changed from unemployment beneﬁts to sickness beneﬁts. We assume
that these workers were still unemployed. A worker is assumed to ﬁnd a job as soon as he or she no longer received
beneﬁts payments. Table A2 in Appendix A provides more detailed information about the number of spells and
the exit states.
72.4 Treatment programs
The unemployed in the treatment group may be confronted with a variety of mandatory acti-
vation programs which we grouped in two categories. First there are “job search programs”.
These programs typically give an overview of available courses and educations, general knowl-
edge about the labor market and speciﬁc knowledge about the possibilities to ﬁnd particular
jobs. The participants are also assisted in their job search, and they are trained in job search
techniques. The duration of the programs is 2 weeks. Second, there is a group of programs which
we labeled “training programs” which consist of three types of programs: short work experience,
employment subsidy, and training and education. Short work experience programs are intended
to uncover the technical skills, social skills or language skills of the individual. Another purpose
is to clarify what would be an appropriate job for the individual. The duration of the program
can be up to 4 weeks. Employment subsidy programs aim to train or retrain professional, social
or language skills at a workplace. The program can take place in a private ﬁrm or in the public
sector. During the program period the employers receive a wage subsidy. Training and education
programs are intended to upgrade the qualiﬁcations (technical, social or language skills) of the
participants. For newly unemployed individuals the duration of training/education programs
can in general only last up to 6 weeks during the ﬁrst 12 months of their unemployment spells
(6 months for individuals below 30 or above 60).12 After 12 (or 6) months of unemployment
there is greater room for providing longer training/education programs.
Figure 2 shows the weekly transition rates to job search programs for the treated and the
non-treated.13 Clearly also some of the non-treated ﬂow into job search programs, which were
usually substantially shorter than the job search programs the individuals in the treatment group
had to attend. In the ﬁrst weeks of unemployment there is hardly a diﬀerence in the inﬂow into
job search programs. After that a lot of the unemployed in the treatment group ﬂow into a
job search program. The peak in the inﬂow rate is between 7 and 9 weeks of unemployment
spell. After 15 weeks hardly anyone enters the job search program. By then about 70% of the
treatment group as well as 15% of the control group have entered a job search program.
12In cases where it is diﬃcult for the unemployed individuals to ﬁnd employment within their professional ﬁeld
or in cases where training/education can give individuals employment within a ﬁeld where there is a lack of labour
the 6 week limit can be dropped and the duration can be up to 1 year.
13Note that the transition rates in all ﬁgures take right-censored durations into account.
8Figure 3 shows the weekly transition rates to training programs. Here too, there is inﬂow of
unemployed from the control group. The peak of the inﬂow of the treatment group is between
18 and 24 weeks. After half a year the cumulative inﬂow probability for the treatment group is
50% while it is 20% for the control group.
The fact that some unemployed from the control group enter labor market programs poses
a problem since a simple comparison between the job ﬁnding rates of treatment group and
control group doesn’t take this into account. If we ﬁnd a positive treatment eﬀect from such a
comparison this will be a lower bound of the true eﬀect.14 Initially we ignore this problem and
focus on the straightforward comparison between treatment group and control group. Later on
we will also deal with the issue of control group individuals attending labor market programs.
3 Exploratory analysis
By way of exploratory analysis we investigate how long workers stay unemployed. Figure 4
presents the survival functions separately for the treatment group and control group. As shown
the treatment group leaves unemployment more quickly than the control group. After 3 months
47% of the control group and 54% of the treatment group have left unemployment. After 6
months 28% of the control group is still unemployed while only 21% of the treatment group
is still unemployed. The diﬀerence between both survival functions increases up to 13 weeks
of unemployment, stays constant until 26 weeks and declines after that. Figure 4 also shows
that the median unemployment duration for the control group is about 14 weeks while for the
treatment group this is 11.5 weeks.
To get an idea of the treatment eﬀects without introducing too much structure in the em-
pirical model, we perform a logit analysis on the probability of leaving unemployment within a
particular time period: Pr(t < tr) =
exp(x0γ)
1+exp(x0γ) and Pr(t ≥ tr) = 1
1+exp(x0γ), where t refers to
the completed duration of unemployment, tr to a threshold (5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 weeks)15, x
is a vector of explanatory variables, and γ a vector of parameters. The explanatory variables
concern gender, age, occupation, immigrant status, previous unemployment experience, county
and unemployment status (see Appendix B for details). We estimated the parameters using the
14The employment eﬀects of Danish active labor market programs are generally found to be small or non-
existing, see e.g. Rosholm and Svarer (2004).
15Note that every individual was observed for at least 26 weeks.
9method of maximum likelihood.
Table 1 shows the estimation results. Estimated over the ﬁrst 5 weeks there is no signif-
icant treatment eﬀect. If the period of observation is expanded the treatment eﬀect becomes
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The speed by which unemployed leave unemployment is also
aﬀected by personal characteristics. Males leave unemployment more quickly than females while
50+ workers stay unemployed longer. Furthermore, there are diﬀerences between occupational
groups. Also, non-Western immigrants need more time to ﬁnd a job than non-Western immi-
grants and native Danes while workers with recent unemployment experience also need more
time to ﬁnd a job. Finally, “excluded workers” have a higher job ﬁnding rate.16 Many of
these workers are unemployed because of bad weather and apparently they leave unemployment
quickly – as soon as the weather improves.
The logit estimates suggest that the treatment programs induce workers to leave unemploy-
ment more quickly. To understand the mechanisms involved we analyze a more detailed model
of unemployment dynamics in the next section.
4 Hazard rate models
4.1 The baseline model
To understand the mechanisms through which the treatment program aﬀects unemployment
dynamics, we analyze job ﬁnding rates, which are deﬁned as transitions out of the beneﬁt
system. Figure 5 shows the job ﬁnding rates separately for the treatment group and the control
group. Clearly the job ﬁnding rates ﬂuctuate a lot but in the ﬁrst 6 months of unemployment
the job ﬁnding rates of the treatment group are always higher than the job ﬁnding rate of the
control group. After 6 months this diﬀerence disappears.
The individual job ﬁnding rate at unemployment duration t conditional on observed char-
acteristics x and treatment status P can be speciﬁed as a proportional hazard model (see Van
den Berg (2001) for details):
θ(t | x,P) = exp(x0β + ϕ(t) + δP) (1)
16Excluded workers are individuals in the treatment group who were excluded from treatment; see Appendix
A for details.
10where β is a vector of parameters representing the eﬀect of personal characteristics and ϕ(t)
represents duration dependence in the transition rates
ϕ(t) = ΣkµkIk(t) (2)
where the µ-parameters describe the stepwise duration dependence with k (= 1,..,43) as a sub-
script for the weekly duration intervals and we normalize µ1 = 0. Furthermore, P is a dummy
variable representing whether (P = 1) or not (P = 0) the individual was assigned to the treat-
ment group. Finally, δ is our parameter of interest, which indicates whether or not activation
inﬂuences the job ﬁnding rate. In the baseline model we assume that δ is independent of the
duration of unemployment and identical for diﬀerent groups of workers. Later on, we relax this
assumption.
The conditional density function of the completed unemployment duration tu that ended in
a transition toward a job can be written as
f(tu | x,P) = θ(tu | x,P)exp(−
Z tu
0
θ(s | x,P)ds) (3)
Since we analyze an inﬂow sample, the log-likelihood L of the model is straightforward,
L = dΣlog(f) + (1 − d)Σlog(1 − F) (4)
where F is the distribution function of f, and d is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the
worker found a job and a value of 0 if the worker is still unemployed or left unemployment for
other reasons.
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates of the baseline model. Consistent with the logit
estimates there is a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect. On average the job ﬁnding rate increases
with 21% (100*(exp(0.19)-1)). All the signs of the explanatory variables are the same as the
estimates of the logit models: Males, workers younger than 50, construction workers (Occupation
3), Danes and workers without recent unemployment experience ﬁnd a job more quickly than
their counterparts. There is a weak tendency towards negative duration dependence in the job
ﬁnding rate after about 20 weeks. From then on, conditional on their observed characteristics
staying unemployed longer reduces the job ﬁnding rate.
Table 3 shows the results if we allow the treatment eﬀect to be dependent on personal
characteristics, unemployment duration or participation status. For purposes of comparison the
11top row of the ﬁrst column replicates the parameter estimate of the treatment eﬀect in Table 2.17
The parameter estimates show that the treatment eﬀect is robust for diﬀerent groups of workers.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in treatment eﬀect between males and females. There are
diﬀerences in treatment eﬀect across age groups but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
treatment eﬀect is constant across ages.18 The ﬁrst column of Table 3 also shows the estimates
of the treatment eﬀect if we distinguish between ﬁve duration intervals. Then it is clear that
the treatment eﬀect is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at short unemployment durations (less
than 5 weeks) and long unemployment durations (more than 30 weeks). Nevertheless, we still
cannot reject the hypothesis that there is one treatment eﬀect.
Furthermore, the ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows the diﬀerences in treatment eﬀect if we
distinguish between before – during – after attendance of a program and if we also distinguish
between job search and training programs. If unemployed participate in a search program –
usually about two weeks – this has a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate.
Apparently participating in such a program does not stimulate nor deter unemployed to ﬁnd jobs.
After they completed the job search program the job ﬁnding rates increase 35%. Participating
in training programs has a clear negative eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate. The job ﬁnding rate
drops 43%. Apparently, once attending such a program the unemployed workers are locked into
it. After the program there is a positive eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate but this is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. It could be the case that indeed the training programs are not helpful
in bringing unemployed back to work more quickly but it is also possible that the period of
observation is too short for the treatment eﬀect to materialize.
It makes sense to start investigating the eﬀects of a program after it has ﬁnished but one
cannot simply ignore the time spent during the program.19 To get some idea about the overall
eﬀect of a program the bottom lines of Table 3 show parameter estimates if we only distinguish
between a before-program eﬀect and “since program start” eﬀects. In this case the program
eﬀects are measured from the moment an individual starts in a program; the during and after
the program eﬀect are imposed to be the same. Now for job search programs the treatment
17Because the other parameter estimates are hardly aﬀected by the speciﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect Table
3 only reports the treatment eﬀects.
18The LR test statistic equals 4.8 which is not signiﬁcant for 4 degrees of freedom.
19Richardson and Van den Berg (2001) for example ﬁnd a positive treatment eﬀect of vocational employment
training in Sweden but only if the time spent in these programs is ignored.
12eﬀect is of the same size as the before-program eﬀect. The training programs have a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate indicating the importance of the locking-in eﬀect.
All in all, from Table 3 we conclude that the overall positive treatment eﬀect consists of two
components. First, there is a threat eﬀect causing some unemployed to leave unemployment
quickly in order to avoid having to attend intensive programs. Second, after individuals attend
job search programs their job ﬁnding rate increases substantially. The positive eﬀects of training
programs are absent or at least not immediately visible.
4.2 Additional sensitivity analysis
In order to investigate the robustness of our results we performed a sensitivity analysis. We
allowed the treatment eﬀect to vary weekly and we distinguished between the eﬀects of ﬁrst,
second and third or higher programs and we allowed for duration dependence of the pre-program
eﬀect. There are some diﬀerences in treatment eﬀect depending on the order of the program
and the duration of unemployment when it concerns the pre-program treatment eﬀect but the
overall picture does not change.20
Furthermore, we allowed for the possibility that unobserved characteristics of unemployed
workers – like motivation – aﬀect their job ﬁnding rates. To account for this we expand the
model and introduce a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) speciﬁcation. Then, the job ﬁnding
rate at unemployment duration t conditional on observed characteristics x, treatment status P
and unobserved characteristics v can be speciﬁed as
θ(t | x,P,v) = exp(x0β + ϕ(t) + δP + v) (5)
The unobserved components (random eﬀects) are assumed to be independent of x and to follow
a discrete distribution with two points of support va and vb
Pr(v = va) = q Pr(v = vb) = 1 − q (6)
in which q has a logit speciﬁcation with
q =
eα
1 + eα (7)
20The parameter estimates are available on request.
13The two points of support indicate that conditional on the observed characteristics and the
treatment status, there are two types of individuals who diﬀer in their job ﬁnding rates. The
set-up of the likelihood is similar to equation 4.
The parameter estimates of the MPH model are presented in the second column of Table 3.
Conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed duration there is a group of 24% with
a lower job ﬁnding rate and a group of 76% with a higher job ﬁnding rate. We cannot reject the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity.21 The introduction of unobserved heterogeneity increases
the estimated treatment eﬀect; the job ﬁnding rate now increases with 30% due to the treatment.
The diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects across various groups, across unemployment durations and
across participation states do not change when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced.
4.3 The treatment eﬀect reconsidered
Clearly there is a strong treatment eﬀect. There are two potential explanations for this eﬀect.
First, it could be that the unemployed workers do not like the treatment, i.e. the treatment
increases the cost of being unemployed. In response they increase their search intensity or lower
their reservation wages, which increases their job ﬁnding rate. If so, the treatment acts as a
punishment, a stick. The second explanation for the treatment eﬀect is that unemployed beneﬁt
from the job search program so they are able to ﬁnd a job more quickly. Then, the treatment
acts as a help, a carrot. It is diﬃcult to distinguish between the inﬂuence of carrot and stick.
Nevertheless it is important because if treatment equals stick there could be cheaper alternatives
than an intensive activation program to get the same eﬀect.
One way to try to distinguish between the two possible explanations is to look at treatment
eﬀects for individuals in the control group. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 some individuals of the
control group also enter job search programs and training programs. As indicated before the job
search programs attended by individuals of the control group were less intensive. Nevertheless,
if a job search program is helping unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly this should be the case
irrespective of whether or not the individual is from the treatment group.22 Therefore, we also
investigate treatment eﬀects for the control group. These additional parameter estimates are
21The estimation results do not improve if we include three mass points.
22Note that in this case we implicitly assume that the entrance into labor market programs of individuals from
the control group is non-selective
14presented in Table 4. As shown allowing for treatment eﬀects for the control group does not
aﬀect the estimates of the treatment eﬀect for the treatment group. For the control group we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant positive treatment eﬀects. For training programs we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
treatment eﬀect. So do the job search programs help unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly? It
is not clear. If job search programs would help unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly one would
expect similar after-program treatment eﬀect for individuals irrespective if they are from the
treatment group or the control group. However, the job search programs attended by individuals
of the control group are much shorter than those of the treatment group. The fact that we ﬁnd
a positive after-treatment eﬀect for the treatment group but not for the control group does
not necessarily indicate that the job search program is ineﬀective. Still, it could be that the
more intensive contact with the program administrators which is obligatory for individuals in
the treatment group and the fear of having to enter a training program are driving the results.
Somewhat speculative we conclude that the treatment eﬀect of the job search program is mainly
driven by threat and punishment rather than by help.
Another way in which a distinction between the two alternative explanations might be es-
tablished is by using information about the meetings between the unemployed and program
administrators. For the control group the meetings are set up as follows. Not later than 1
month after an individual became unemployed there is a ﬁrst meeting to deal with the elec-
tronic CV of the unemployed. The purpose of the meeting is to secure that the contents of the
CV is appropriate and reﬂects the desires and abilities of the unemployed. The electronic CV
can be used by potential employers. At the ﬁrst meeting it also has to be discussed how the job
search of the individuals can be supported. During the remaining part of the unemployment
spell the unemployed have to attend meetings at least every 3 months. The purpose of the
meetings is to follow up on individuals job search eﬀorts and to assess what type of ALMP
would help the individual closer to a regular job. Since a meeting should be held at least every
3 months the percent attending meetings should not be smaller than 1/13 (7.7%) every week.
As shown in Figure 6 this requirement is clearly fulﬁlled.
In the treatment group the meeting sequence also has to fulﬁll the requirements above.
In addition to that in the period between the job search program and the training program
the unemployed have to attend meetings every week (Storstrøm County) or every second week
(South Jutland County). As shown in Figure 6 the meeting frequency remains higher in the
15treatment group after 4 months of unemployment. To what extent job search is discussed at the
meetings is not observed in the data. We have information about diﬀerent meeting types but it
is diﬃcult to sort the meeting types according to their focus on job search. Table 5 summarizes
the meeting frequencies by quarter. In every quarter the meetings frequency in the treatment
group is substantially higher than in the control group.
One of the tasks of the PES is to help employers ﬁnd appropriate workers. Employers may
ask the PES to help recruiting employees. We have also investigated the extent to which the
treatment group and control group are referred to these employers. The numbers are calculated
by dividing the total number of meetings held in a given week (between the unemployed and
employers who posted a job order at the PES) with the number of individuals who are still
unemployed in this week.23 As shown in Table 5 the average meetings rate between unemployed
and employers is very low – on average 0.5% in the ﬁrst 9 months of unemployment. And, there
does not appear to be a diﬀerence between treatment and control group. Hence the treatment
group does not seem to receive more job oﬀers than the control group when we are only looking
at job orders received by the PES.24
5 Conclusions
Labor market programs often combine elements of help and activation, i.e. carrot and stick.
The help component may increase human capital of participants or assist them in ﬁnding a
job; the activation component may stimulate unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly because of
the increased costs of being unemployed. This paper investigates how programs of job search
assistance and training help unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly. The analysis is based on
data collected during a ﬁeld experiment in Denmark. Over a period time workers that became
unemployed in two Danish counties were randomly assigned to a treatment group which had to
attend labor market programs and a control group which didn’t have to do that. The treatment
program consisted of an intensive two weeks job search course. After this course the unemployed
had to attend regular meetings with PES staﬀ where advice was given about search strategies
and search eﬀorts were monitored. Furthermore, unemployed could be assigned to training
23We do not know whether the meeting actually resulted in a job match/employment
24In fact, most jobs in Denmark are ﬁlled without the PES being directly involved.
16programs.
The main result of the analysis is that assignment to the treatment group increased the
job ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers on average with 30%. This result is robust and of the
same magnitude for diﬀerent groups of workers. When comparing programs we ﬁnd substantial
diﬀerences. Training programs did not bring unemployed back to work more quickly, probably
because of a locking-in eﬀect. Once in a training program job ﬁnding rates decreased substan-
tially. Whether there are more positive long-run eﬀects of training programs is not clear. The
increase in job ﬁnding rates of the individuals in the treatment group is mainly due to two eﬀects.
The ﬁrst eﬀect concerns the high job ﬁnding rate before any program is attended. Apparently
some individuals want to avoid going into a program and therefore leave unemployment quickly.
The second eﬀect concerns the after-program eﬀect. Once an individual of the treatment group
ﬁnishes a job search program the job ﬁnding rate is higher for three reasons. First, the job search
course may have been helpful in more eﬃcient job search. Second, the threat of having to attend
training programs may have stimulated unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly. Third, the in-
tensive meetings between unemployed and program administrators increased the costs of being
unemployed but may also have assisted the unemployed in their job search. The ﬁrst reason is
a carrot, the second is a stick, and the third is a mixture of the two. Somewhat speculative we
conclude that it is in particular the stick of the treatment that causes the positive eﬀect on the
job ﬁnding rate.
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19Figure 1: Timing of various activities for the treatment group – from the start of the unemploy-
ment spell
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25Table 1: Probability of leaving unemployment within a particular period of time; parameter
estimates logit models
Period of time (weeks)
5 10 15 20 25
Treatment eﬀect 0.11(0.08) 0.29(0.07)∗∗ 0.36(0.07)∗∗ 0.35(0.07)∗∗ 0.34(0.07)∗∗
Explanatory variables
Male 0.39(0.10)∗∗ 0.65(0.08)∗∗ 0.63(0.08)∗∗ 0.76(0.08)∗∗ 0.79(0.08)∗∗
Age 30-39 0.17(0.11) 0.13(0.10) 0.15(0.10) 0.23(0.10) 0.24(0.10)
Age 40-49 0.11(0.11) −0.17(0.09) 0.03(0.09) 0.15(0.10) 0.26(0.10)
Age 50-59 −0.15(0.12) −0.41(0.10)∗∗ −0.45(0.10)∗∗ −0.34(0.10)∗∗ −0.32(0.10)∗∗
Age 60+ −0.17(0.24) −0.77(0.21)∗∗ −0.85(0.20)∗∗ −0.65(0.20)∗∗ −0.62(0.20)∗∗
Occupation 1 −1.04(0.34)∗∗ −0.69(0.24)∗∗ −0.82(0.22)∗∗ −0.94(0.22)∗∗ −0.80(0.22)∗∗
Occupation 2 −0.16(0.17) −0.03(0.14) −0.23(0.14) −0.47(0.14)∗∗ −0.48(0.14)∗∗
Occupation 3 0.79(0.13)∗∗ 1.14(0.14)∗∗ 0.79(0.15)∗∗ 0.88(0.19)∗∗ 0.86(0.21)∗∗
Occupation 4 −0.70(0.17)∗∗ −0.16(0.13) −0.29(0.12)∗∗ −0.64(0.12)∗∗ −0.66(0.12)∗∗
Occupation 5 −0.65(0.21)∗∗ −0.74(0.18)∗∗ −0.80(0.16)∗∗ −1.19(0.16)∗∗ −1.14(0.16)∗∗
Occupation 6 −0.42(0.13)∗∗ −0.22(0.11)∗∗ −0.28(0.10)∗∗ −0.37(0.11)∗∗ −0.50(0.11)∗∗
Occupation 7 0.02(0.17) 0.25(0.14)∗ −0.18(0.14) −0.32(0.14)∗∗ −0.34(0.14)∗∗
Occupation 8 −0.21(0.17) 0.00(0.15) −0.10(0.15) −0.43(0.16)∗∗ −0.45(0.17)∗∗
Occupation 9 −0.22(0.24) −0.01(0.21) −0.18(0.20) −0.63(0.20)∗∗ −0.47(0.21)∗∗
Occupation 10 −0.40(0.22)∗ −0.20(0.18) −0.31(0.17)∗ −0.61(0.18)∗∗ −0.81(0.18)∗∗
Immigr. Western −0.01(0.25) −0.18(0.22) −0.12(0.21) −0.10(0.22) −0.17(0.22)
Immigr. non-Western −0.01(0.19) −0.45(0.18)∗∗ −0.38(0.16)∗∗ −0.47(0.17)∗∗ −0.60(0.17)∗∗
Previous unempl. 1 −0.85(0.19)∗∗ −0.79(0.16)∗∗ −0.89(0.15)∗∗ −0.86(0.15)∗∗ −0.64(0.15)∗∗
Previous unempl. 2 0.09(0.19) −0.19(0.16) −0.25(0.16) −0.47(0.16)∗∗ −0.31(0.16)∗
Previous unempl. 3 −0.39(0.17)∗∗ −0.28(0.14)∗∗ −0.40(0.13) −0.13(0.13) −0.17(0.14)
Storstrøm County 0.02(0.08) 0.00(0.07) −0.01(0.07) −0.01(0.07) −0.03(0.07)
Excluded Member 1.04(0.27)∗∗ 0.56(0.26)∗∗ 0.45(0.26)∗ 0.46(0.27)∗ 0.49(0.29)∗
Note: In the estimates also a constant is included and weekly dummy variables for the week of
inﬂow into unemployment; these parameter estimates are not reported (but they are available
on request); standard errors in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95% (90%) level.
26Table 2: Parameter estimates baseline hazard rate model
Treatment 0.19 (0.04)**
Constant -3.62 (0.14)** 8-9 weeks 0.88 (0.12)**
Male 0.42 (0.04)** 9-10 weeks 0.66 (0.13)**
Age 30-39 0.01 (0.05) 10-11 weeks 0.65 (0.13)**
Age 40-49 -0.03 (0.05) 11-12 weeks 0.99 (0.12)**
Age 50-59 -0.26 (0.05)** 12-13- weeks 0.92 (0.13)**
Age 60+ -0.24 (0.11)** 13-14 weeks 0.95 (0.13)**
Occupation 1 -0.50 (0.12)** 14-15 weeks 0.77 (0.14)**
Occupation 2 -0.33 (0.08)** 15-16 weeks 1.18 (0.13)**
Occupation 3 0.59 (0.07)** 16-17 weeks 1.13 (0.13)**
Occupation 4 -0.40 (0.07)** 17-18 weeks 1.11 (0.14)**
Occupation 5 -0.62 (0.09)** 18-19 weeks 0.78 (0.14)**
Occupation 6 -0.29 (0.06)** 19-20 weeks 0.80 (0.15)**
Occupation 7 -0.27 (0.08)** 20-21 weeks 0.85 (0.16)**
Occupation 8 -0.17 (0.08)** 21-22 weeks 1.23 (0.14)**
Occupation 9 -0.27 (0.11)** 22-23 weeks 0.43 (0.19)**
Occupation 10 -0.41 (0.10)** 23-24 weeks 0.50 (0.19)**
Immigrant Western -0.10 (0.12) 24-25 weeks 0.76 (0.17)**
Immigrant non-Western -0.31 (0.09)** 25-26 weeks 0.86 (0.17)**
Previous unemployed 1 -0.57 (0.08)** 26-27 weeks 0.57 (0.19)**
Previous unemployed 2 -0.10 (0.09) 27-28 weeks 0.59 (0.20)**
Previous unemployed 3 -0.16 (0.07)** 28-29 weeks 0.73 (0.19)**
Storstrøm County 0.04 (0.04) 29-30 weeks 0.64 (0.22)**
Excluded Member 0.36 (0.13)** 30-31 weeks 0.68 (0.22)**
Duration dependence 31-32 weeks 0.87 (0.22)**
0-1 weeks – 32-33 weeks 0.52 (0.27)**
1-2 weeks 0.49 (0.11)** 33-34 weeks 0.78 (0.27)**
2-3 weeks 0.67 (0.11)** 34-35 weeks 0.72 (0.31)**
3-4 weeks 0.62 (0.11)** 35-36 weeks 0.96 (0.28)**
4-5 weeks 0.85 (0.11)** 36-37 weeks 0.25 (0.40)
5-6 weeks 0.63 (0.12)** 37-38 weeks 0.75 (0.35)**
6-7 weeks 0.67 (0.12)** 38-39 weeks 0.60 (0.43)
7-8 weeks 0.75 (0.12)** 39-43 weeks 0.25 (0.35)
-Loglikelihood 13745.0
Note: In the estimates also dummy variables for the week of inﬂow into unemployment; these
parameter estimates are not reported (but they are available on request); standard errors in
parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95% (90%) level.
27Table 3: Parameter estimates hazard rate models with alternative speciﬁcations for the treat-
ment eﬀect and the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity – hazard rate models
No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity
-Loglikelihood -Loglikelihood
Average eﬀect 0.19 (0.04)** 13745.0 0.26 (0.04)** 13711.3
By gender
Men 0.18 (0.04)** 0.25 (0.06)**
Women 0.21 (0.06)** 13744.8 0.29 (0.07)** 13711.4
By age group
Age < 30 0.23 (0.07)** 0.32 (0.09)**
Age 30-39 0.12 (0.07)* 0.21 (0.08)**
Age 40-49 0.14 (0.07)** 0.16 (0.09)*
Age 50-59 0.30 (0.07)** 0.37 (0.09)**
Age 60+ 0.24 (0.21) 13742.6 0.31 (0.26) 13709.8
By unemployment duration
1-4 weeks 0.10 (0.08) 0.12 (0.08)
5-9 weeks 0.29 (0.07)** 0.32 (0.07)**
10-17 weeks 0.23 (0.07)** 0.32 (0.07)**
18-30 weeks 0.15 (0.08)* 0.33 (0.09)**
≥ 30 weeks -0.02 (0.17) 13741.9 0.20 (0.19) 13708.4
By participation status – I
Before participation 0.25 (0.05)** 0.27 (0.05)**
During job search program 0.14 (0.10) 0.18 (0.10)
After job search program 0.30 (0.05)** 0.36 (0.06)**
During training program -0.56 (0.11)** -0.56 (0.12)**
After training program 0.20 (0.14) 13708.1 0.27 (0.14)* 13680.9
By participation status – II
Before participation 0.26 (0.04)** 0.29 (0.05)**
Job search program 0.27 (0.05)** 0.32 (0.06)**
Training program -0.33 (0.09)** 13719.4 -0.30 (0.10)** 13691.8
Note: The parameter estimates for the explanatory variables, the weeks of inﬂow and the du-
ration dependence parameters are not reported because they are very similar to the estimates
in Table 2; discrete unobserved heterogeneity with two points of support; standard errors in
parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95% (90%) level.
28Table 4: Parameter estimates treatment eﬀects for the treatment group and the control group




Before participation 0.23 (0.05)** 0.25 (0.05)**
During job search program 0.11 (0.10) 0.14 (0.10)
After job search program 0.26 (0.05)** 0.31 (0.06)**
During training program -0.62 (0.11)** -0.63 (0.12)**
After training program 0.14 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14)
Control group
During job search program -0.10 (0.22) -0.11 (0.22)
After job search program -0.05 (0.09) -0.09 (0.11)
During training program -0.92 (0.18)** -1.07 (0.19)**
After training program 0.03 (0.18) -0.15 (0.22)
-Loglikelihood 13688.0 13658.8
Note: The parameter estimates for the explanatory variables, the weeks of inﬂow and the du-
ration dependence parameters are not reported because they are very similar to the estimates
in Table 2; discrete unobserved heterogeneity with two points of support; standard errors in
parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95% (90%) level.
29Table 5: Meetings between unemployed and program administrators; average weekly frequency
(%)
Weeks of Treatment Control Diﬀerence
unemployment Group Group
All meetings
0-13 26.2 13.0 13.2
14-26 30.0 9.9 20.1
27-39 17.9 9.7 8.2
Average 25.0 10.9 14.1
Meetings with employer
0-13 0.6 0.5 0.1
14-26 0.7 0.7 0.1
27-39 0.2 0.4 -0.2
Average 0.5 0.5 0.0
Note: All meetings concern meetings between unemployed and case workers; meetings with
employers concern meeting between unemployed and employers for vacancies mediated by the
PES; presented are percentages calculated as the number of meetings held in a given week
divided by the number of individuals who are still unemployed in this week.
30Appendices
A Details about the data
The selections of the treatment group and the control group are made in three steps. First,
every week (from week 44 in 2005 to week 9 in 2006), generally on a Tuesday, newly unemployed
individuals who registered themselves as unemployed at the PES during the previous week and
who were still unemployed on Friday in the previous week were selected to participate in the
experiment. For example an individual who became unemployed in week 43 of 2005 and who
were still unemployed on Friday 28 October 2005 was selected to participate in the experiment
on Tuesday 1 November 2005. Hence the treatment group and the control group consist of newly
unemployed individuals who registered at the PES during the weeks from week 43 in 2005 to week
8 in 2006. Second, individuals who (in the administrative registers) are unemployed because
of bad weather or under some work sharing arrangement are excluded from the experiment.
Individuals who ﬁnd a job before the selection process is accomplished are excluded from the
experiment as well. Third, individuals born between the 1st and the 15th of a given month are
assigned into the treatment group. Other individuals are assigned into the control group. Thus,
2542 individuals were assigned to the treatment group and 2638 individuals to the control group.
We do, however, not use the full sample of individuals. Some individuals were not correctly
assigned according to their birth date. There were 15 individuals registered as belonging to the
control group which should have been in the treatment group. And, 12 individuals registered
as belonging to the treatment group should have been in the control group. Whether the
individuals where in fact given the correct treatment (treatment or no treatment) we do not
know. We excluded these individuals (27) from the empirical analysis.
Also, the discarding of individuals from the experiment who are unemployed because of bad
weather or who are under some work sharing arrangement were not done with 100 percent
precision. Some individuals who were registered to be unemployed because of bad weather
or work sharing arrangements appeared in the treatment group. We excluded 43 individuals
because they were unemployed for these reasons. We also exclude 37 individuals who move
abroad after they were selected to participate in the experiment or because they died.
31Finally, we excluded 553 individuals who did not receive UI beneﬁts within the ﬁrst 6 weeks
after the date when they were registered as unemployed at the PES. One reason for this selection
criterion is that information on UI beneﬁts is used to determine the duration of unemployment
spells. If an individual never received UI beneﬁts we will not be able to determine when the un-
employment spell ended. There are several reasons why not all unemployed individuals receive
UI beneﬁts from the beginning of the unemployment spell. The ﬁrst two days of an unemploy-
ment spell the unemployed individuals do not receive UI beneﬁts from the UI funds but from the
previous employer. Information about these beneﬁts paid by the employer is not included in our
data. Individuals who had just completed an education that made them eligible for UI beneﬁts
can only receive UI beneﬁts one month after they have ended their education. When an individ-
ual voluntarily quits a job and becomes unemployed he/she can not receive UI beneﬁts the ﬁrst
3 weeks after the resignation. The disadvantage of excluding individuals that did not receive UI
beneﬁts shortly after becoming unemployed is of course that many individuals with very short
unemployment spells are not included in the analysis. The transition rate into employment is
hence downward biased during the ﬁrst few weeks of the unemployment spells. More individuals
are excluded from the control group than from the treatment group. This may be because the
program administrators have been more careful with excluding individuals who should not be
a part of the experiment when they were looking at the treatment group than when they were
looking at the control group. It would have been problematic if we excluded more individuals
from the treatment group than from the control group. This might have indicated that part of
the program eﬀect would not appear in our estimates because treatment group members to a
larger extent than control group members found jobs before they became eligible for UI beneﬁts.
Another reason for excluding individuals who did not receive UI beneﬁts shortly after becoming
unemployed is that a signiﬁcant fraction of the individuals selected into the experiment were
actually not eligible for UI beneﬁts and should not have been included in the experiment (one
reason for the incorrect assignment into the experiment is that the information available for the
program administrators when the selection process was made was not always of suﬃcient qual-
ity - part of the information needed for the selection process was supplied by the unemployed
individuals).
The steps of going from the gross sample to the net sample are the following:
1. Person is from one of the two regions and are selected to participate in the experiment.
2. Correct assignment into treatment and control according to the civil registration number.
3. Person is not unemployed because of bad weather or because he/she is under some work
sharing arrangement (according to information in administrative registers).
4. Person does not die and does not move abroad after the ﬁrst day of unemployment.
5. Person receives UI beneﬁts not later than 6 weeks after having registered himself/herself
as unemployed at the PES.
32Table A1 quantiﬁes these steps:
Table A1 From gross to net dataset
Numbers
Steps Treatment Control All
group group
1 2542 2638 5180
2 2530 2623 5153
3 2510 2600 5110
4 2493 2580 5073
5 2229 2291 4520
Percentages
1 49.1 50.9 100.0
2 49.1 50.9 100.0
3 49.1 50.9 100.0
4 49.1 50.9 100.0
5 49.3 50.7 100.0
Clearly the distribution of the individuals across the two groups is hardly aﬀected by the various
steps in the selection process. Table A2 gives more details about the number of spells and the
exit states:
Table A2 Spells and exit states (numbers and percentages)
Treatment Control All
group group
Number of spells 2229 (100) 2291 (100) 4520 (100)
Exit state:
Employment 1852 (83.1) 1774 (77.4) 3626 (80.2)
Early retirement pay 17 (0.8) 28 (1.2) 45 (1.0)
Study grants 7 (0.3) 16 (0.7) 23 (0.5)
Rehabilitation beneﬁts 2 (0.1) 2 (0.1) 4 (0.1)
Social assistance 6 (0.3) 7 (0.3) 13 (0.3)
Maternity pay 34 (1.5) 42 (1.8) 76 (1.7)
Right censored 311 (14.0) 422 (18.4) 733 (16.2)
33B Deﬁnitions and means of explanatory variables
The explanatory variables used in the analysis are deﬁned as follows:
• Male: dummy variable – reference group: female
• Age dummies: Age 30-39, Age 40-49, Age 50-59, Age 60+ years – reference group: Age <
30 years.
• Occupational dummies: Occupation 1: Academics, engineers, economists, Occupation 2:
Oﬃcials, servants and salaried employees - white collar, Occupation 3: Construction, Oc-
cupation 4: Trade, Occupation 5: Self-employed, Occupation 6: Multidisciplinary, Occu-
pation 7: Welfare workers, Occupation 8: Metal workers, Occupation 9: Food industries,
Occupation 10: Other industries – reference group: Unskilled and skilled workers - blue
collar.
• Dummies immigrant status: Immigrant Western, Immigrant non-Western – reference
group: native Danes.
• Previous unemployment status: Continuous variables indicating the time period on public
income support (0-1); Previous unemployed 1: Average degree of public income support
dependence 0-1 year before unemployment spell, Previous unemployed 2: Average de-
gree of public income support dependence 1-2 years before unemployment spell, Previous
unemployed 3: Average degree of public income support dependence 2-3 years before un-
employment spell
• Storstrøm County: dummy variable – reference group: South Jutland County.
• Excluded Member: dummy variable for members of treatment group, that do not par-
ticipate; many of these individuals became unemployed because of bad weather and they
will return to their job quickly once the weather improves – reference group: members of
treatment group that participate.
34Table B1 gives an overview of the means of the explanatory variables for the treatment group
and the control group. As shown means of the variables are almost identical for both groups




Age < 30 0.24 0.24
Age 30-39 0.24 0.26
Age 40-49 0.26 0.24
Age 50-59 0.22 0.24
Age 60+ 0.03 0.03
Occupation 1 0.02 0.02
Occupation 2 0.07 0.07
Occupation 3 0.07 0.07
Occupation 4 0.10 0.11
Occupation 5 0.05 0.04
Occupation 6 0.13 0.13
Occupation 7 0.07 0.07
Occupation 8 0.05 0.05
Occupation 9 0.03 0.03
Occupation 10 0.03 0.04
Other occupation 0.37 0.38
Immigrant Western 0.03 0.02
Immigrant non-Western 0.05 0.04
Native Danes 0.93 0.94
Previous unemployed 1 0.21 0.20
Previous unemployed 2 0.26 0.25
Previous unemployed 3 0.26 0.25
Storstrøm County 0.53 0.53
Excluded Member 0.03 0.00
Observations 2229 2291
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